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In his comment, professor Knut Heen states the following: 
“In his effort to prove and demonstrate that transferable quotas and licenses will improve the 
profitability of the industry, his use of both indicators and data warrants a comment. Using 
data from the Directorate of Fisheries in Norway makes it difficult to support Hannesson’s 
conclusion that the transferability of quota and licenses improves the profitability of the 
fishing vessels.” 
Much of the analysis in my paper is based on return before tax, excluding financial costs, in percent of 
invested capital. In my view, this is the most appropriate time series available to gauging the 
profitability of the industry. Unfortunately this time series is too short to cover the period before the 
rules of quota trading were liberalized, due to changes in definitions in the accounts published by the 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. I have therefore resorted to also showing return before tax in 
percent of revenue. Alternatively, I could have used operating margin in percent of revenue, which is 
what professor Heen recommends, but the results are qualitatively similar, the main difference is that 
using the operating margin would shift the curve upwards (see accompanying figure). There is a clear 
break for the better in both of these time series in the mid-1990s. Professor Heen points out that the 
steep increase 1994-97 was in part due to an upward jump in the price of mackerel. Other positive 
developments, such as increasing catches of blue whiting in these years, also played a role. But the 
increase in profits has been maintained; profits averaged –3 percent of revenues 1980-94, but 11 
percent 1995-2010 (using the operating margin would change these numbers to 7 versus 17 percent). 
This increase would not have been maintained unless access to the industry had been restricted, and I 
note that professor Heen seems to endorse closed access. Furthermore, the structural rationalization of 
the purse seine fleet was resumed in 1996, after having stalled in the late 1980s and early 1990s; the 
number of small purse seiners (less than 6000 hectolitres) fell from 29 in 1995 to 11 in 2010 while the 
number of large purse seiners has remained much the same (it fell from 74 in 1995 to 69 in 2010). It is 
likely, to say the least, that this rationalization has been promoted by the more liberal rules for trading 
in fish quotas introduced in 1996. 
I do not think that the cost per unit of effort, which professor Heen reports in some detail, tells us 
much of interest about the effects of quota trade and fleet rationalization. He defines effort as vessel 
days and shows that the cost per vessel day has increased considerably. Professor Heen makes no 
correction for inflation, but that is unlikely to change his results qualitatively. The reason why the cost 
per vessel day has increased is probably that the boats are now on average larger than they used to be 
and use more fuel and perhaps other fishing gear. But they also catch more fish, so the rising cost is 
more than outweighed by larger revenues. From 1994 to 2010 the operating costs of the purse seiners 
rose threefold, but their revenues rose almost fourfold (by a factor of 3.7 to be exact). Fleet 
rationalization could easily mean a higher cost per boat, but it also means larger and more productive 
boats. 
Professor Heen points out that in order to correctly calculate the return on capital invested in boats, 
one should only correct for financial costs associated with investing in boats. True enough in principle, 
but financial costs are reported only in the aggregate in the accounts at hand. If these data were 
available, the said correction would shift the return on boats slightly downwards, but we would still 
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have the difference in return on total capital and on boats only. The point I wanted to illustrate is that 
the return on total capital looks more normal than the return on boats only. In the long run, the return 
on total capital in the fishing industry should be the same as in other industries, after correcting for 
differences in risk. In the quota managed industry a part of the total invested capital is the value of 
purchased fish quotas while the open access industry invests in boats only and aligns the return on 
investment with other industries through excessive costs.  
Professor Heen does not appear to be against transferable quotas as such, but he objects to the way 
quotas have been given away for free so that quota holders have been able to enrich themselves by 
selling out of the industry. He is not alone in having this view, and it is not difficult to sympathize with 
this in principle. But things look different once we take into account the situation in the industry at the 
time individual quotas were introduced. The industry was making a loss, and the quotas were seen as 
an instrument to prevent a further erosion and to help the industry towards normal profitability. 
Anyone suggesting to sell quotas to the industry or to tax them would have been laughed out of court; 
any such proposal would not have had the slightest chance to be accepted; the quotas were a hard 
enough “sell” to the industry even if they were given away for free. Some industry people may have 
supported the quota regime because it enabled them to avoid bankruptcy and get out without too great 
a loss. Seen against this background, the windfall gains obtained by the first generation of quota 
holders were a necessary cost for putting in place a reasonably efficient system of management in the 
industry. 
Some would even contest that this is a cost at all. What did those who sold out of the industry do with 
their gains? Did they just buy themselves a place in the sun, or did they use their gains to invest in 
other ventures and diversify their fishing communities? My impression is that the latter certainly is not 
unheard of, and possibly typical. We should be under no illusion that governments always use 
taxpayers’ money better than the latter would do on their own. 
 
Figure 1: Operating margin and profit before tax for Norwegian purse seiners 1980-2010. 
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